Landy: Philsophy as Fiction [8: involuntary m]
very good note on 198n61, cricizing Deleuze
Landy is surely right when he writes that “it is not impressions that contain memories, but vice versa: a memory writes Marcel, is like ‘some forgotten scroll on which [a]re recorded impressions of other days’ (GW 82).” (199n62)
see p110, “involuntary memory is not really memory at all”
“What involuntary memory gives to the future book is less its content than its form, if not is very condition of existence: a narrating instance sufficiently unified as to be able to say “I” and to speak for a multiplicity of selves in past and present tenses.” (111)
Landy is surely right when he writes that “it is not impressions that contain memories, but vice versa: a memory writes Marcel, is like ‘some forgotten scroll on which [a]re recorded impressions of other days’ (GW 82).” (199n62)
see p110, “involuntary memory is not really memory at all”
“What involuntary memory gives to the future book is less its content than its form, if not is very condition of existence: a narrating instance sufficiently unified as to be able to say “I” and to speak for a multiplicity of selves in past and present tenses.” (111)
posted by E at 2:33 PM
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